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Notes
NECESSITY OF INSTRUCTING JURY ON MEANING
OF "WILLFUL, DELIBERATE AND
PREMEDITATED"
Justice Maxey has very sensibly held that omitting to
instruct a jury in a murder case as to the meaning of the
words, "willful, deliberate and premeditated", as used in
the statute defining murder in the first degree, is not re-
versible error. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 305 Pa. 302, 157
Atlantic 689.
For many years efforts were made by the courts to
assign to each of these words a distinct meaning, though
probably the inventors of the phrase did not do so. The
most famous and frequently quoted effort is that of Justice
Agnew in Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9.
But many of the more recent cases have followed
Chief Justice Lowry in holding that "the true criterion of
murder in the first degree is the intent to take life. The
deliberation and premeditation required by the statute are
not upon the intent, but upon the killing. It is delibera-
tion and premeditation enough to form the intent to kill,
and not upon the intent after it has been formed." Keenan
v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. 55.
It follows that if an intent to kill is discovered, the
required deliberation and premeditation are ipso facto dis-
covered for they always exist where the intent exists. "The
fact of purpose being shown, the time necessary for de-
liberation and premeditation, whether long or short, must
have passed just as certainly as the existence of a grain of
corn demonstrates that there has been the time necessary
to its growth." Commonwealth v. Buccieri, 153 Pa. 535.
W. H. Hitchler.
